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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between firm age and innovation has been an enduring topic of interest. We 
contribute to this research by studying how the effect of firm age on the quality of explorative and 
exploitative innovations is affected by the firm-specific and industry tenure of the talent-resources 
(employees) that the firm utilizes. We start with the baseline predictions that firm age is related to the 
development of better exploitative innovations and worse explorative innovations. However, the 
tenure of employees intervenes in these relationships, by way of bringing in new knowledge, mental 
models, and beliefs. We predict that longer firm-specific and industry tenure of employees would 
enhance the positive effect of firm age on the quality of exploitative innovations, while amplifying the 
negative effect of firm age on the quality of explorative innovations. In addition, for both the baseline 
and the moderating effect, we also formulate a prediction comparing the quality of explorative 
innovations with those of exploitative innovations. We find support for the moderating effects of 
human capital tenure for the quality of explorative innovations, but not for the quality of exploitative 
innovations. We reason that the latter may be due to the need for some level of exploration even in 
exploitative innovations, at least in the setting we study – the video game industry. Our results suggest 
that the negative effects of firm age on the quality of explorative innovations can be mitigated by 
talent-resources (employees) the firm uses who have lower firm-specific and industry-wide tenure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In times where innovation has become ever more important and product lifecycles ever 
shorter, firms are confronted by a panoply of problems, including the need to balance exploitative 
innovations that sustain existing product lines with the explorative innovation of new products 
(Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Christensen and Bower 1996). One key insight arising from innovation 
studies that address these tensions is that age shapes firms‟ innovative capabilities by making firms 
better at exploitation rather than exploration (Sørensen and Stuart 2000). Our study addresses a gap in 
understanding how human capital can help aging firms to produce better explorative innovations. Our 
aim is to further deepen the understanding of the link between human capital and the quality of 
exploration and exploitation produced by a firm.  
Successful firms have recognized that as they age, they need to maintain and improve their 
skills at explorative innovativeness with new human capital. Accordingly, we study how human 
capital moderates a firm‟s tendencies to be better (or worse) at exploitative and exploratory 
innovations as the firm ages. In particular, we find that the relative newness, i.e., lower tenure, of 
creative talent, whether in the firm or in the industry, can “reinvigorate” a firm by mitigating the 
negative effects of firm age on the quality of its explorative innovations. This is critical for firms in 
high technology industries, and is made even more so when a firm enters into product areas requiring 
new kinds of talent, as was the situation that Apple faced recently: “As Apple moves from iPods, 
iPhones and iPads into an entirely new category of product [i.e., the watch], it is looking beyond its 
existing staff in Cupertino for the talent required to build it.” (Bradshaw 2013).1  
Since the early characterization of innovative activities as being explorative or exploitative in 
nature (March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993), one important issue has been to understand the 
conditions by which firms can face the future, i.e., can be explorative, while capitalizing on past 
advantages, i.e., can be exploitative (He and Wong 2004, Raisch et al. 2009). While this assumes that 
firms are able to manage these twin forces without any “vested interest” in either the future or the 
                                                          
1 With the passing of Steve Jobs, Apple‟s co-founder Steve Wozniak expressed the concern that Apple might become 
complacent, “returning to just milking its existing markets and not astounding us with new categories of products, or totally 
astounding ones.” (Fiegerman 2012). Wozniak further provided his thoughts on keeping a post-Steve Jobs Apple invigorated 
by noting that Apple: "did go through a period of introducing a lot of key younger talent when Steve Jobs returned…One 
suggestion is that we look at doing that again." (Fiegerman 2012). 
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past, in reality, a natural tendency has been for firms to emphasize and build on their past capabilities 
and routines, making them more adept at exploitative work rather than at explorative work (Sorensen 
and Stuart 2000). This being the case, the issue of how to improve capabilities to be better at 
explorative innovative activity – arguably the more challenging activity of the two – has been studied 
in various ways. Proposals range from investing in capabilities such as the ability to experiment with 
technologies (Ahuja and Lampert 2001) and the “forecasting” or developing of scenarios of the future 
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Gavetti and Levinthal 2000), to the building of the actual technical 
capabilities themselves (Rothaermel and Hess 2007). The antecedents to these proposals involve 
capabilities and routines that can recognize the value of opportunities and new ideas, as well as the 
ability to reorganize resources to create solutions. These depend substantially on organizational 
members to introduce new knowledge, to readjust to changed situations, or to enhance the 
organizational capabilities to accomplish the same (Drazin and Rao 2002, March 1991, Peretti and 
Negro 2007, Tzabbar 2009). While the effects of human capital on organizational innovation are 
increasingly studied, we lack a systematic understanding of how aging firms might improve their 
explorative capability via new organizational members (Perretti and Negro 2007, Taylor and Greve 
2006). Focusing on this problem, we theorize that human capital that is relatively new to the firm and 
to the industry can moderate the effect of firm age, such as by way of changing the capabilities and 
routines of firms. Specifically, aging firms can improve the quality of their explorative innovations, to 
the extent that their members have lower firm-specific tenure or low industry tenure. 
We test our ideas in the context of the video game industry. The video game industry is 
rapidly transforming, even as games themselves influence more mainstream work environments 
(Edery and Mollick 2008). Specifically, we study the quality of original content games (explorative 
innovation), the quality of non-original content games (exploitative innovation), and the comparative 
quality of original content games and non-original content games‟ (exploration in comparison to 
exploitation) that are developed by game development studios. We find that, first, the studio‟s age has 
(a) a positive effect on the quality of exploitative innovations it develops, (b) a negative effect on the 
quality of the explorative innovations it develops, and (c) a negative effect on the quality of the 
explorative innovations, as compared to exploitative innovations, developed by the studio. Second, we 
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find that the negative effect of studio age on the quality of explorative innovations, both on their own 
and as compared to exploitative innovations, is mitigated by the studio having human capital with 
lower tenure in the firm, as well as human capital with lower tenure in the industry. That is, an aging 
firm‟s disadvantage at explorative innovations can be mitigated by the presence of “fresh voices” that 
can reinvigorate the firm‟s explorative capability. However, we find no such moderating effect of 
human capital tenure on the quality of exploitative innovations. As we note in our discussion section, 
the absence of such an effect on exploitation might be due to the fact that even exploitative products 
(i.e. those that are sequels or use licensed content) in this type of creative industry need to 
demonstrate some exploration to maintain users‟ interest and demonstrate quality.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Firstly, in the next section, we review work on 
the relationship between firm age and innovation, deriving our baseline predictions - that age 
reinforces use of a firm‟s existing routines and capabilities, making it better at exploitative 
innovations, worse at explorative innovations, and also worse at explorative innovations as compared 
to exploitative innovations. Secondly, in the three sections that follow, we establish the link between 
human capital and the firm. In particular, we discuss how human capital tenure, both in the firm and 
in the industry, can moderate the effect of firm age on the outcomes we study (quality of explorative 
innovations, quality of exploitative innovations, and the quality of explorative innovations as 
compared to exploitative innovations), by way of changes to routines, capabilities, and mental models. 
We then describe our setting, data, estimation, and results, concluding with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM AGE AND INNOVATION 
In the study of factors that are important determinants of innovative success in firms, the 
focus has shifted away from economists‟ early concerns with issues such as firm size to one 
dominated by managerial and organizational factors, such as capabilities.
2
 Within the management 
tradition, the initial concerns focused on addressing the effects of organizations‟ structures and 
abilities to configure their resources, as well as on how these capabilities are affected by firm age 
                                                          
2 Historically, while following Schumpeter‟s lead, the economics literature has found the relationship between firm size and 
innovation to be inconsistent (Cohen and Levin 1989, Cohen and Klepper 1996). 
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(Burns and Stalker 1961, Thompson 1965, Stinchcombe 1965). However, while early findings 
regarding firm age and innovation focused on the liability of newness, further study has found the 
effect to be more mixed, depending on the context of the firm (Anderson and Tushman 1990, Le 
Mens et al. 2011, Methe et al. 1996).
3
  
Plumbing deeper into the new and old firm argument reveals another central issue, which is 
that aging firms‟ capabilities can become misaligned with changing environments such as newly 
emergent paradigms (Anderson and Tushman 1990, Barnett 1990, Barron et al. 1994, Christensen and 
Rosenbloom 1995, Dosi 1982, Tushman and Anderson 1986, Utterback and Abernathy 1975). The 
emergence of dominant designs promotes incremental innovations, and favors exploitative capabilities 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990). At heart is the issue of organizational inertia, involving the tendency 
of aging firms to engage in reliable or rationally accountable behavior at the expense of being more 
explorative (Hannan and Freeman 1984, Kelly and Amburgey 1991).
4
 This highlights the broader 
distinction between exploration and exploitation, which has become a central concept for studying 
innovation at the organizational level (Levinthal and March 1993, March 1991). It describes the 
tradeoff between investing in existing capabilities addressed to their current market relative to new 
ones addressed to the firms‟ future. Employing this exploration-exploitation distinction, Sorensen and 
Stuart (2000: 106) demonstrated a fundamental age effect: that “Older firms build more on previous 
innovative activity” within established technological trajectories; and that as a result, firms get better 
at exploitative innovations rather than at explorative ones as they age. This argument was predicated 
on the firms‟ capabilities and routines becoming rigid and mismatched to changing environments 
(Christensen and Bower 1996, Gilbert 2005, Hannan et al. 1996, Levitt and March 1988, Leonard-
Barton 1992). In the sections that follow, we will develop the premise that human capital tenure has a 
moderating influence on how firm age relates to how well firms perform at explorative and 
                                                          
3 In contrast to the liability of newness argument (Stinchcombe 1965), later studies found that new firms may be better fitted 
to their environment, both technology-wise (i.e. capability-wise), and structurally (Katila and Shane 2005, Sine et al. 2006), 
and suffer less from inertial forces or founding conditions (Boeker 1989, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990, Hannan and 
Freeman 1984). Other studies find older or established firms have advantages in knowledge and capabilities (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, Klepper and Simons 2000, Methe et al. 1996), and industry-specific effects (Criscuolo et al. 2012, Sine et al. 
2006, Katila and Shane 2005). 
4 Inertia could be ascribed to factors that have to do with capabilities or routines, including the failure to “provide 
collaborative structures and processes to solve problems creatively and connect innovations with existing businesses,” or to 
make such projects an effective part of an overall strategy (Dougherty 1992, Dougherty and Hardy 1996: 1122). 
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exploitative activities. By “how well” (or “better”), we mean the quality of their innovative efforts in 
these two categories (and not the extent or level of the activity itself). 
The understanding of firms as being about capabilities and routines (which involve local 
search and reduce uncertainty through rules and programs for action) was originally encapsulated in 
the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963). This became a basis for key follow-on 
perspectives, including the resource- and knowledge-based views (Kogut and Zander 1992, Sirmon et 
al. 2007). Both views consider innovation to be the result of the firm‟s ability to recombine resources, 
which is a major mechanism underlying innovations (Schumpeter 1934). The diversity of a firm‟s 
stock of knowledge affects its performance, in part by being the necessary material through which 
combinations occur (Kogut and Zander 1992, Spender 1996). With time, firms develop capabilities 
and routines that match the technology regimes that those firms initially arose within. These ease the 
firms‟ work with familiar technologies and markets, in effect, better enabling exploitation in those 
same areas (Ahuja and Lampert 2001, Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995). Contributing to this is the 
accumulated advantage that comes from learning and greater competence with a particular technology 
(i.e. capability) in a given area (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In accumulating capabilities, a firm 
generates increasing returns through a positive reinforcement between a given capability and 
demonstrated economic returns from that competency (Levinthal and March 1993, March 1991).
5
 
This causes the firm to reinforce those exploitative capabilities (Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995, 
Sorensen and Stuart 2000). These interactions can lead to “learning” or “competency” traps, whereby 
firms continually augment their existing capabilities, making it harder for them to break out or better 
explore as they age (Ahuja and Lampert 2001, Levitt and March 1988, Sorensen and Stuart 2000). 
The general thrust relating to exploitation highlighted by this broad range of studies is that 
firms will learn, create the relevant capabilities, and develop the appropriate routines to improve 
within a technological regime. As such, aging firms can be expected to be associated with 
mechanisms such as routines and capabilities that are better suited to producing better exploitative 
innovations, leading to our prediction: 
                                                          
5 The routines and capabilities built up during successful periods are better suited for local search and the achieving of 
solutions in nearby problem areas (Cyert and March 1963, Martin and Mitchell 1998, Nelson and Winter 1982) such as those 
found in productivity enhancements, incremental innovations, and learning curves (Argote and Epple 1990).  
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Hypothesis 1a: Firm age is positively related to developing better exploitative innovations. 
 
At the same time, studies on inertia suggest that the aging of firms will result in a negative 
effect on the capabilities to develop better explorative innovations. That is, following Sorensen and 
Stuart (2000), we expect that the ability to create products for a given era‟s or market segment‟s 
needs, which are positively related to firm age, will be ill-suited to exploring for a different era‟s or 
market segment‟s needs, leading to lower quality explorative innovations. Therefore, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Firm age is negatively related to developing better explorative innovations. 
 
Finally, combining the previous two effects together, we expect that, as they age, firms would 
be able to develop higher quality exploitative innovations, as compared to explorative innovations 
(Sorensen and Stuart 2000). Therefore, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Firm age is negatively related to developing better explorative innovations, as 
compared to developing better exploitative innovations. 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND EXPLORATIVE CAPABILITY 
Many of the proposals suggested for improving firms‟ innovative potential invoke some form 
of argument involving human capital, either at the team level (Peretti and Negro 2007, Taylor and 
Greve 2006), or at the firm level (e.g., Ahuja and Lampert 2001, Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, 
Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, Rothaermel and Hess 2007). At the individual level, the failure to 
readdress organizational exploration is often ascribed to the inability to change mental models, 
“beliefs”, and other cognitive constructs (Barr et al. 1992, Tripsas 2009, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000); 
these often being ascribed to decision-making at the higher, executive, levels in organizations. Such 
“beliefs” may be about the fit of a given technology to the current and anticipated market situations 
(Kogut and Zander 1992, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). The beliefs may themselves be defined by 
attributes of individuals, such as leaders, who might also be hired for the “newness” of their 
perspective to an organization (Kraatz and Moore 2002, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). While the 
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increasing age or stage in the lifecycle of leaders within the industry is associated with their degree of 
risk-taking (Miller and Shamsie 2001), the introduction of new members has also been recognized as 
a factor that refreshes teams‟ ability to innovate (Peretti and Negro 2007, Taylor and Greve 2006).  
 
FIRM SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL TENURE AND EXPLORATIVE CAPABILITY 
While factors such as capabilities and routines are usually key influences on firms‟ innovative 
performance, recent calls for a human capital-based microfoundations of strategy have emphasized 
the importance of human capital as a basis for routines and capabilities (Felin et al. 2012). Human 
capital is the new “old” resource – one increasingly implicated as being crucial to firms‟ 
competitiveness (Hitt et al. 2001, Hitt et al. 2006). With rising market uncertainty, knowledge-based 
resources, and in particular, human resources, have become even more valuable to firms (Miller and 
Shamsie 2001). At the firm level, innovation studies have shown that the mobility of human capital 
between firms led to increases in the stock of knowledge in the target firms, and that refreshing the 
stock of knowledge through human capital helps firms stay innovative (Almeida and Kogut 1999, 
Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Rothaermel and Hess 2007, Tzabbar 2009). Human capital could also 
complement firms‟ overall innovative capability, suggesting that the effects of individuals can be seen 
to be separate from investments in capabilities (Rothaermel and Hess 2007). While these studies 
demonstrate the importance of the relationship between human capital and capabilities, they usually 
do not consider exploration and exploitation separately, and are considered independently of firm age. 
Studies have shown that the technological distance between new resources being introduced to the 
firm and the firms‟ own resources can help firms to innovate and to do so in further away fields 
(Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Tzabbar 2009).
6
  
We theorize that the tenure of human capital affects the firm‟s capabilities and routines by 
way of the mental models and other knowledge that the human capital holds. As has been noted in the 
literature, not only does human capital constitute capability on its own, it also has implications for 
capabilities and routines (Rothaermal and Hess 2007). Our argument extends this by focusing on how 
                                                          
6 The relationship between individuals and the firm‟s capabilities (as constituted by other individuals) is complex, as 
individuals can co-opt opportunities available to other individuals as well as “activate” those other individuals‟ efforts (e.g., 
Tzabbar and Kehoe 2014, Kehoe and Tzabbar 2015). It has also been shown that human capital forms a complementary 
stock of knowledge to collaborative capital, understood as the number of alliances (Tzabbar et al. 2008).  
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human capital tenure influences the relationship between firm age and the development of better (or 
worse) explorative and exploitative innovations. Some anecdotes show how human capital can 
rejuvenate aging firms‟ explorative ability: For example, despite repeated successes, Pixar hired Brad 
Bird as an additional director of animated features to renew its organizational abilities.
7
 There is a 
duality in the role of human capital, not only as holders of organizational knowledge but also as a 
means for directly contributing knowledge to the combinative creation of products and services. A 
firm‟s combinative capability can age when its stock of knowledge is not being added to, since its 
existing “recombination potential…is…finite, … there are only so many ways that existing elements 
of knowledge can be fruitfully recombined” (Ahuja and Lampert 2001: 528). An extension of this 
idea is that the introduction of new talent and knowledge can help firms by promoting new 
combinations with their current stocks of knowledge (Tzabbar 2009). Such combinative capabilities 
are at the heart of important forms of innovation such as architectural innovation (e.g. Henderson and 
Clark 1990, Tushman and Anderson 1986) and recombinative innovation (e.g. Arthur 2009). Routines 
also play a valuable role in facilitating the resource recombinations used in innovation (Galunic and 
Rodan 1998, Hargadon and Sutton 1997, Zander and Kogut 1995).  
By refreshing the firm‟s stock of knowledge, human capital shapes the firm‟s combinative 
capability (Hitt et al. 2001, March 1991, Sirmon et al. 2008). The underlying logic of recombining 
different knowledge elements, resources or technological components involves various forms of 
knowledge integration (Henderson and Clark 1990, Kogut and Zander 1992, Sirmon et al. 2007). 
Combinative activities are often visible at the project team and individual levels (Hargadon and 
Sutton 1997, Sirmon et al. 2008), as are the re-bundling of new combinations of knowledge and other 
resources (Obstfeld 2012, Taylor and Greve 2006). Lead talent such as “star scientists” can enhance 
collaborations in novel ways, suggesting that their value is as much in generating new knowledge 
combinations as in their individual efforts (Grigoriou and Rothaermel 2014, Zucker and Darby 1996). 
Sirmon, Hitt and Ireland (2007) also suggest that managers and resource management processes play 
                                                          
7 “Bird joined Pixar in 2000, when the company was riding high… Concerned about complacency, senior executives Steve 
Jobs, Ed Catmull, and John Lasseter asked Bird… to join the company and shake things up” (Rao et al. 2008). The “shake 
up” that Bird created on Pixar‟s next animated feature film The Incredibles included developing new routines and 
capabilities that the studio lacked, such as expertise in traditional two-dimensional animation for the three-dimensional film 
environment, and routines to make the studio more efficient at using the content it created (Desowitz 2004, Kober 2007).  
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important roles in configuring resources, including acquiring new resources (“structuring”), 
combining them (“bundling”), and deploying or otherwise putting them to use (“leveraging”). In this 
situation, the entrepreneurial creation of new project teams is one means of bringing about new team 
compositions (Obstfeld 2012).  
The interaction of the organizational and individual levels has also been identified in the 
literature by way of routines and mental constructs. Routines can create persistent practices, and it is 
also well-known that routines are “held” as knowledge by individuals, and that individuals produce as 
well as perform routines.
8
 Research on video game studios has shown that producers - the human 
capital involved in enacting routines - can be more critical for firm performance than even the creative 
talent itself (Mollick 2012). The beliefs held by human capital can also obstruct organizations‟ 
innovativeness, or reinvigorate them (Akgun et al. 2006, Dougherty 1992, Skilton and Dooley 2010, 
Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). The literature on organizational inertia illustrates the ramifications, at 
organizational levels, of old beliefs formed from prior success with existing paradigms. In general, 
members with longer tenure within the organization, or experienced in the cultural milieu and existing 
socio-technical paradigms, will be better suited to sustaining and enhancing the abilities of aging 
firms, helping those firms in exploitative work, or in developing better exploitative innovations (Allen 
et al. 1988, Cirillo et al. forthcoming, Huckman et al. 2009). They reinforce this belief by perpetuating 
existing routines to target similar types of products, such as sequels. As an article noted of the 
exploitative nature of videogame studios that had created successful intellectual properties: “Call of 
Duty is pretty overdone as a series … There's only so much you can do in the warfare scenario.” 
(Polson 2012).  
Newer talent to a firm can be expected to bring in new knowledge and mental models, which 
can disrupt existing team mental models or beliefs, thereby moderating the negative effects of 
organizational age (Obstfeld 2012, Skilton and Dooley 2010). This increases the diversity of the 
                                                          
8 An important part of an organization‟s stock of knowledge is individually held as procedural knowledge and individual 
schema (Galunic and Rodan 1998, Cohen and Bacdayan 1994). This stock is inured through the experience an individual 
gains in an industry or a firm. Routines enact their combinative role by various means, e.g. storing knowledge in 
organizational memory (Hargadon and Sutton 1997, Walsh and Ungson 1991), relating new knowledge sources to 
capabilities (Lewin et al. 2011), supporting the organizing of resources and implementation of new initiatives (Hargadon and 
Sutton 1997, Obstfeld 2012), and the stock of knowledge itself being used for generating new knowledge or routines (Cohen 
and Bacdayan 1994). 
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accumulated base of knowledge and permits a wider set of possible combinations of those knowledge 
resources, therefore mitigating the effect of aging firms being better at exploitative innovations. A 
video game industry article provides insight into how studios might rejuvenate themselves: “AAA 
[i.e., games with high production and artistic quality] publishers and developers should seek to add 
some indie genes [i.e., developers not affiliated with mainstream studios] to their own DNA” 
(Peterson 2015). On the other hand, without infusions of newer talent, and following from the 
literature on organizational inertia, firms can continue to build on and enhance their existing beliefs 
and knowledge base. We therefore derive the following moderating effect of human capital with 
longer firm-specific tenure on the effect of firm age on exploitation: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The positive effect of firm age on exploitation, as described in H1a, will be 
stronger with longer firm-specific employee tenure. 
 
We next consider how the firm-specific tenure of employees might moderate the prediction 
we formulated in H1b. The dominance of existing team and lead developer mental models may be 
broken up by the presence of members with lower tenure in those teams and industries (Peretti and 
Negro 2007, Skilton and Dooley 2010). In contrast, human capital with longer firm-specific tenure is 
likely to adhere to their existing mental models, this being the case with the human capital 
individually acting by itself (Audia and Goncalo 2007). In turn, this can make the firm less capable at 
developing good explorative innovations, reducing their quality. Conversely, human capital with low 
firm-specific tenure should mitigate the negative effect of firm age on the quality of explorative 
innovations. Therefore, we predict: 
  
Hypothesis 2b: The negative effect of firm age on exploration, as described in H1b, will be 
stronger with longer firm-specific employee tenure. 
 
Finally, reasoning from the preceding two hypotheses (as with H1c), we expect that the effect 
of human capital with longer firm-specific tenure should further amplify the negative effect of age on 
the quality of the explorative innovations of a firm, relative to their exploitative innovations: 
12 
 
 
Hypothesis 2c: The negative effect of firm age on the firm’s ability to develop better 
explorative innovations, as compared to developing better exploitative innovations, as 
described in H1c, will be stronger with longer firm-specific employee tenure. 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL TENURE IN THE INDUSTRY AND EXPLORATIVE CAPABILITY 
The industry tenure of human capital can also moderate the effect of firms‟ aging on the 
quality of their explorative and exploitative innovations. Such a “tenure in industry” effect (in what 
we term the “focal” industry) is different from the “newcomer-to-the-firm” effect, since it is possible 
that employees that are relative newcomers to the firm may still have had long tenure within the 
industry. While employees who are inexperienced may require on the job training, at the same time 
they are likely to bring with them skills and experiences honed in settings outside the focal industry. 
These employees might also possess beliefs that have not internalized the industry-wide practices 
(such as routines found throughout the industry and “industry recipes”); practices that could constrain 
their firms‟ exploration (Spender 1996). Outsiders to the industry may bring in new “frames”, that is, 
perspectives on the potential of new technologies, as well as a greater capacity for entrepreneurial 
action (Kaplan and Tripsas 2008). Industry mental models may emerge around knowledge such as 
classification schemes and what is perceived to be industry structure (Porac et al. 1989, Porac et al., 
1995), thereby helping outsiders perceive new opportunities that lie outside of the focal industry.
9
 In 
the video game industry, interviews conducted indicate that established publishers tend to focus on 
conventional approaches, and studios are aware of this as they prepare their proposals (Tschang 
2007). 
Human capital that is newer to the focal industry can bring fresh perspectives and knowledge 
that might not have been previously captured in the industry, thereby increasing an aging firm‟s 
diversity of knowledge and aiding it in creating better explorative products and strategies (Crossland 
                                                          
9 In games, as elsewhere, industry trends occur and are widely adopted (Koster 2015) to the point that firms require specific 
skill sets tagged to the (then) dominant designs – says a designer about the current state of jobs: “you needed to be a game 
designer... [for example, one] with mobile experience... with a knowledge and passion for every infinite runner game on the 
planet...” (Wondra 2015). On the innovation side, there is anecdotal evidence in studies of technology showing that 
outsiders‟ lower degree of industry knowledge, coupled with their different base of domain knowledge, allows them to 
disrupt existing industry-conforming routines within firms (e.g., “business as usual” investments in the existing capabilities) 
- such were the cases with Polaroid‟s digital imaging group, Xerox PARC‟s computing group, and other “skunk works” 
projects (Bennis and Biederman 2007, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). 
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et al. 2014, March 1991, Perretti and Negro 2007, Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Perretti and Negro 
(2007) showed that members in project teams who were new to the film industry, i.e. with less 
experience, can affect a team‟s innovation by moderating the homogenizing effect that “old-timers” 
might have on the knowledge of film production teams. The underlying idea may be that the human 
capital‟s experience in other domains provides new perspectives on and new combinations with the 
domain that they are coming into (Crossland et al. 2014, Hargadon and Sutton 1997, Tzabbar 2009).  
Lower industry tenure within a focal industry is also associated with knowledge that is 
different from that of the focal industry‟s. These perspectives and means for new combinations are 
likely to enable aging firms to transcend or forego existing routines and capabilities (especially as 
encoded in industry recipes) that are generally causing them to be better at exploitative innovations 
than at explorative ones. Even in creative industries such as film and games, the approaches for 
making different kinds of projects involve “recipes” (Mezias and Mezias 2000, Tschang 2007).10 In 
the video game industry for instance, many firms chased ever larger, complex projects involving high 
production values (termed as “AAA” titles). However, commenting on development trends, one 
industry article noted: “While the first-person shooter is one of the most popular video game genres 
around, it often relies on tried and true mechanics and concepts”. Said independent game developers 
who were interviewed: “Reliance on stale ideas can often lead to creative stagnation… FPS games 
(evolution) got slower because of how Halo dominated the console market. I think multiplayer is fun 
in Halo and Call of Duty, but not every game needs to mimic them.” (Polson 2012). Many games 
collectively fell off the proverbial “cliff” in the late 2000s to mid 2010s, when technological 
disruptions occurred and consumer interest starting growing around the multitude of new platforms. 
One way of countering this inertia is to introduce inventors and designers who are newer to the 
industry, and who think disruptively while bringing different skill sets. Two well-known cases in 
video games are Masaya Matsuura, the rap musician who made one of the first music genre games, 
Parappa the Rapper, and Keita Takahashi, a sculpture student who, within two years of joining 
                                                          
10 An example of such encoding in “industry recipes” is the shift by Hollywood movie studios, based on scale and scope, 
towards B movies and a vertically integrated production structure, embodying production efficiencies made possible by 
industry level production techniques. The more flexible post-war form of production network that resulted allowed 
independent producers more leeway to “disrupt” the conventional production model (Caves 2000, Robins 1993). In games, 
many examples abound of how a certain genre becomes “standard,” or a feature becomes “standard” across much of a genre 
of games (Koster 2015). 
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Namco, was embarked on his revolutionary game Katamari Damacy (Takahashi 2004, Tschang 
2007). 
In terms of the mechanism at work, the premise behind the updating of outdated capabilities 
(Sorensen and Stuart 2000, Miller and Shamsie 2001) has traditionally rested on the treatment of 
inventions as combinative outcomes of individuals‟ different knowledge bases, as shown in case 
studies and other studies of technology and industry (Arthur 2009, Fleming and Sorenson 2004, 
Hargadon and Sutton 1997, Henderson and Clark 1990, Schumpeter 1934, Usher 1929). Given that 
capabilities comprise individuals‟ knowledge that are recombined, more novel knowledge 
combinations arise when knowledge from farther flung domains can be brought into the firm via such 
individuals (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Tzabbar 2009). This effect of divergent thinking as arising 
from exposure to different domains is well established in studies of individual creativity, with 
analogical thinking cross-fertilizing these different domains, leading to new mental models (Gruber 
1974).
11
 Analogical thinking is also posited as a key mechanism by which diverse and new 
knowledge, including from non-focal industry domains, is brought into the work of teams (Dunbar 
1997, Gruber 1974, Hargadon and Sutton 1997, Perretti and Negro 2007),
12
 and in historical studies of 
innovation which show “industries constantly combining their practices and processes with 
functionalities drawn from newly arriving toolboxes – new domains.” (Arthur 2009: 164).  
Our premise is that, at the firm level, newer industry recipes and combinative knowledge can 
arise from having organizational members with lower industry tenure. Thus, the positive effect of age 
on organizational exploitation seen in H1a can be accentuated (mitigated) by having members who 
have higher (lower) tenure in the focal industry. Human capital with longer tenure in the focal 
industry is likely to be more familiar with, and able to further refine, existing industry recipes, aiding 
the quality of an aging firm‟s exploitative efforts. Conversely, human capital that has shorter industry 
                                                          
11 Thagard (2012) points out that, of the instances of historical invention for which analogies are documented, most are 
“long” analogies, that is, coming from outside of the domain that they infuse. Cases of historical inventions also illustrate 
how important inventions and theories arise from inventors exposed to knowledge from “outside” of a traditional industry. 
This includes the inventors and creators of the means of measuring nautical longitude (Sobel 2010), the theory of evolution 
(Gruber 1974), and geological mapping (Winchester 2009). Simonton‟s studies of historically great artists illustrate that “the 
domain in artistic disciplines often incorporates ideas from outside the domain per se” (Simonton 2010: 160). 
12 The question is whether this effect is stronger when individuals have less tenure. While studies of individual creativity 
trace this over the historical lifecycle of individuals, these cases show that their “impact on the domain” is arguably 
relatively most at odds with the field at their initial point of productive entry, i.e., when their tenure is lowest. 
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tenure might be less entrenched in existing industry recipes and is likely to bring in other knowledge 
and perspectives. While these are likely to be helpful for the development of better exploratory 
innovations, as we will formalize in H3b and H3c, they are not likely to aid an aging firm to produce 
better exploitative innovations (especially as compared to human capital with longer industry tenure, 
who would be in a better position to further refine and extend the industry recipes that they are more 
familiar with). Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The positive effect of firm age on exploitation, as described in H1a, will be 
stronger with longer industry employee tenure. 
 
On the other hand, human capital with low tenure in the focal industry should mitigate the 
negative effect of firm age on the quality of exploratory innovations, as we formulate in H1b. This 
would have happened through new knowledge, new combinations, and possibly the bringing in of 
recipes from other industries, all of which are more likely to allow a focal firm to adapt and change 
the consequences of recipes in its focal industry. Conversely, human capital with longer tenure in the 
focal industry is likely to further amplify the negative relationship between firm age and the quality of 
the firm‟s exploratory innovations. Therefore, we predict: 
  
Hypothesis 3b: The negative effect of firm age on exploration, as described in H1b, will be 
stronger with longer industry employee tenure. 
 
Finally, we look into the implications of human capital industry tenure for the prediction we 
formulate in H1c. Considering the preceding two hypotheses together, we conclude that the effect of 
human capital with longer industry tenure on the ability of an aging firm to produce better exploratory 
innovations, as compared to better exploitative innovations, would also be negative: 
 
Hypothesis 3c: The negative effect of firm age on the firms’ ability to develop better 
explorative innovations, as compared to developing better exploitative innovations, as 
described in H1c, will be stronger with longer industry employee tenure. 
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DATA  
 To test our hypotheses, we use data on the video game industry. The video game industry 
emerged over 40 years ago (Wolf 2008). As an entertainment setting, games are similar to movies, but 
encounter more frequent technological discontinuities (Koster 2015). Firms and employees alike have 
to keep up not only with technologies, but also consumer preferences, and need the ability to envision, 
design and implement highly complex products with millions of lines of programming code and with 
more art than some animated feature films. For instance, there was a one million percent increase in 
game program size between the days of the Sega Genesis console in the 1980s and games seen in the 
late 2000s (Fullerton 2008). The industry is turbulent and has historically involved much turnover of 
firms, with many new firms coming about from spinoffs by industry veterans, often starting afresh by 
adding new team members to a core team, or startups by newcomers (Hotho 2013, Tschang 2007, 
White and Searle 2013). While veterans and newcomers alike may innovate or make incrementally 
innovative products in the new firm (i.e. exploit), at the same time “old firms” may also have to 
develop new intellectual property (IP) (i.e. explore) in light of falling sales for older IP and the 
changing environment. As such, this industry is a compelling setting to study the “new firm, old 
employees” and “old firm, new employees” blends of firm age and employee tenure that we focus on.  
Game development is organized in a project setting. While many articles have been based on 
the film industry, film projects are newly constituted each time from a “floating pool” of labor by the 
“movie studio”, which is effectively a shell company with a few key executive heads. In contrast, the 
typical game studio operates more like a firm (such as with technology firms), with its own enduring 
(human and otherwise) resource base. The longer project durations of game projects and the need to 
build capabilities (e.g. if studios build their own technology for reuse across projects, or to specialize 
in unique gameplay approaches) creates a need for the game studio to hold onto its core talent, and to 
keep its talent engaged on a project pipeline (Muzyka 2002). This is corroborated by the industry‟s 
main periodical‟s survey of 2500 game developers, which showed that in 2011, layoffs after 
completion of a project were only about 13 percent (Miller and Bulkley 2013). By engaging with 
multiple projects, firms are able to use knowledge and resources across multiple projects.  
While most new games face much uncertainty during the development process, new titles 
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within a series (sequels) or using established (licensed/franchised) content within a familiar style of 
gameplay still have to be sufficiently refreshing to warrant consumers‟ interest (Tschang 2007). Even 
so, games based on original IP pose more “exploratory” challenges than a sequel or games that use 
franchised content. Consider this postmortem of a (new content IP) project, Tropico, by Poptop, a 
studio that had made a successful sequel of another game prior to it: “These were uncharted waters for 
Poptop. RT2 (Railroad Tycoon 2) had been based very closely on Sid Meier's classic Railroad Tycoon 
... The upside was that a good part of the design work had been done for us. The downside, as we 
were to find out on our next project [the new title], was that it left us a bit naïve about the effort it 
would take to create a new game from an original idea.” (Smith 2001). 
This setting is appropriate in terms of aligning our theoretical elements to our purposes 
(understanding the effects of human capital tenure on moderating firm age effects). For example, 
inertial effects are observed in this industry, with success begetting sequels - becoming the “curse of 
success” (Tschang 2007). An established designer, Raph Koster, rued this situation in a well-known 
talk, referring to the need for developers to break free of their habits of producing games for 
themselves and other niche game players (Wallace 2006). Combinative innovation is a common 
mechanism by which studios seek to bridge the familiar and the new. Innovations are created by, 
among other means, borrowing content or themes from other media, and combining them in new ways 
or with other new elements (Tschang and Szczypula 2006). Examples include the reapplication of a 
kind of game mechanic from one game to another, or the adoption of the same type of content (e.g. 
the type of world, such as a fantasy setting, or content such as a comic book‟s superheroes) from one 
game to another.
13 
Along with these, the continuing technological changes within the industry, and the 
increasing complexification of products and efforts, require new routines and practices to be created.  
Unlike movies, game consumers have to pay as much as $50 per title (Fullerton 2008), and 
routinely spend more than ten hours on a single game, ensuring that they are careful with their choice. 
Thus, critical reception, written up in online venues, often by such game consumers acting as 
freelance reviewers themselves, as well as more limited-circulation print magazines, are a dominant 
                                                          
13 Tschang (2007) notes how designers iteratively thought through the process of applying the mechanics of a “city building 
game” to different historical and cultural settings, as well as to different types (series) of city building games. 
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mode of assessment. There were, and still are, hardly any “professional” reviewers in this industry 
akin to famed movie reviewers (e.g. Gene Siskel and Roger Ebert), so users also seek their 
information online through various websites, some of which have long-standing reputations.
14
 We 
adopt the use of online reviews in much the same spirit as other studies in marketing and management 
(see for instance Dellarocas et al. [2007]). 
 Our data were coded from Mobygames, an online database for information on games (e.g. 
Mollick 2012). Mobygames is as extensively used by studies on the game industry setting (and game 
industry professionals) as the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) has been used by scholars in similar 
studies of the film industry. The website is run by a private firm that sells services with the data, but 
the content itself is user-contributed. Most user input comes through their checking the developer 
(name and position), studio and publisher information on a particular game, and then inputting it into 
the appropriate fields through an interface. Mobygames also lists review scores on games from online 
periodicals, print magazines, and game review websites. We can trace data for games released back to 
1977 (we omit casual games, games released only as apps, or smartphone only games). Therefore in 
the construction of our variables for studio age or the tenure of employees there is no left censoring. 
 
Dependent variables 
 Quality of exploitative games. We measured the quality of exploitative games developed by a 
studio by using the average scores of the media reviews for these games. We define exploitative 
games as games that are either part of sequels or games that use franchised content (i.e., non-original-
content games). We do not suggest that these games involve no exploration at all by the studio. 
However, it is well understood in this context that, relative to games that are neither part of sequels 
nor use franchised content, the games that do these are more exploitative (and less exploratory).   
Quality of exploratory games. We measured the quality of exploratory games developed by a 
studio by using the average scores of the media reviews for these games. As we note above, we 
categorize exploratory games as those that are neither parts of sequels nor use franchised content (i.e., 
original-content games). Even though any kind of creative and innovative endeavor is likely to 
                                                          
14 For example, three of the most well-known sites - GameSpy Gamespot and IGN - were all founded in 1996.  
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include some level of exploration (both for this setting as well as others), games that are neither part 
of sequels nor use franchised content are characterized as involving greater exploration. 
Relative quality of exploratory games. We measured the relative quality of a studio‟s 
exploratory games, as compared to exploitative games, by using the average scores of the media 
reviews for the games in each category. Specifically, we subtracted the average score of the media 
reviews of non-original content (i.e., exploitative) games released by the studio in a given year from 
the average score of the media reviews of original content (i.e., exploratory) games released by the 
studio in that year. Even though a studio might get better (or worse) in developing high-quality games 
as it ages, our measure captures the difference in the quality of original-content (i.e., exploratory) 
games as compared to non-original-content (i.e., exploitative) games in a given year.
15
 
 
Independent variables 
 Studio age is the number of years since the studio has first released a game. We use this 
variable to test H1a, H1b, and H1c. 
 Studio tenure of lead team is the average studio-specific tenure of all employees who were 
part of the lead team for any games released by the studio in that year. The studio-specific tenure for 
an employee who is part of any lead team is the number of years since that employee has first 
appeared as being credited in any role in a game that was released by the focal studio (i.e. the studio 
for which studio-specific tenure is being calculated). We use the interaction term between this 
variable and Studio age to test H2a, H2b, and H2c. 
 Industry tenure of lead team is the average industry tenure of all employees who were part of 
the lead team for any games released by the studio in that year. The industry tenure for an employee 
who is part of any lead team is the number of years since that employee has first appeared as being 
credited in any role in a game (regardless of the studio that had developed that particular game). We 
use the interaction term between this variable and Studio age to test H3a, H3b, and H3c. 
                                                          
15 Even though we refer to the exploratory and exploitative games as “original content” and “non-original content” games, 
respectively, it is important to note that games that use franchised content or that are sequels still include varying degrees of 
original content. Our contention is that, consistent with the clear understanding in this setting, games that are neither sequels 
nor use franchised content are on average “more original” and closer to capturing the characteristics of explorative 
innovations than games that are either sequels or that use franchised content (the latter two being “less original” and closer to 
capturing the characteristics of exploitative innovations). 
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Control variables 
 We control for studio size in two ways. First, we control for Lead team size, which is the total 
number of (unique) employees who have appeared as part of any lead team in any game released by 
the studio in that year. We also control for the Cumulative number of games released, which is the 
total number of games the firm has released up to the present year. As we already have a measure for 
Studio age, this cumulative count provides an indicator of the overall, age-adjusted, activity of the 
studio, based on the idea that studios with more resources might release more games. 
 We also control for the Proportion of original content games released, which is a time-
varying measure of the proportion of all games the studio has released up to the present year that use 
original content (i.e., games that contain neither franchised content nor are sequels). While we use 
studio fixed-effects estimations, it remains possible that a particular studio might shift its activity over 
time to have its production comprise a larger or smaller proportion of games using original content. 
Such a drift might affect the quality of the exploitative or exploratory games released by the studio (as 
well as, by implication, the relative quality of exploratory games). 
 While we use two measures of the average firm-specific and industry-wide tenure of 
employees to test our hypothesized effects (H2a/H2b/H2c and H3a/H3b/H3c), the dispersion of the 
tenure of these employees is also important to account for (Sørensen 2002). Employees with different 
levels of dispersion of tenure might have the same average tenure, and therefore this is relevant to 
control for. In other words, a group of employees that is more homogenous with respect to their tenure 
might have different implications for the quality of different types of games developed by the studio 
than a group of employees that consists of individuals whose tenure varies widely, even if the average 
tenure for both groups is the same. Accordingly, we calculate two control variables: Standard 
deviation of industry tenure of lead team, which is the standard deviation of the industry tenure of 
employees who have appeared in any lead team in games released by the studio in that year, and 
Standard deviation of studio tenure of lead team, which is the standard deviation of the studio tenure 
of employees who appeared in any lead team in games released by the studio in that year. 
 In addition to the control variables we describe above, which are entered in all of our models, 
the models we use to test H1a/b, H2a/b, and H3a/b (the predictions about the [absolute] quality of 
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exploitative and exploratory games on their own, rather than in comparison to each other) also include 
an additional control variable each. For the predictions about the quality of exploitative games (H1a, 
H2a, H3a) we also include a variable control for the Quality of exploratory games developed by the 
studio, while for the prediction about the quality of exploratory games (H1b, H2b, H3b) we also 
include a variable to control for the Quality of exploitative games developed by the studio. 
 Finally, in all of our models, we enter a set of indicator variables to control for year-specific 
effects, and our estimations incorporate studio-fixed effects to account for any time invariant studio 
level heterogeneity.
16
 
 Selection variable. In order to enter our estimation sample for each year, a studio needs to 
release at least one game with original content (i.e., exploratory game) and at least one game that is 
either a sequel or that uses franchised content (i.e., exploitative game), in that year. Even though our 
estimation models account for studio age and studio size, the studios that are more likely to have at 
least one release in each category in a given year might still be of a different “type” than studios that 
do not have at least one game in each category in a given year. To take this possibility into account 
and adjust our estimation for possible sample selection issues that might result from it (Heckman 
1979), we calculate the inverse Mill‟s ratio (labeled as Lambda, ) and include this variable in all of 
our specifications. In order to calculate this variable, we add, as an exclusion restriction, the Number 
of past years in which the studio released both categories of games (meaning at least one game that 
used original content and at least one game that was a sequel or that used franchised content) to 
Model 6 as in Table 2, and use that specification to implement a Probit estimation to predict the 
likelihood that a studio would enter our estimation sample in a given year (the result of this estimation 
is reported in the Appendix). We suggest that this is an appropriate variable to use in this manner 
because (a) it is expected to be related to whether a studio enter our estimation sample in a given year, 
on the basis that studios that have released both types of games on more occasions in the past are 
likely to do so subsequently as well and (b) it is not expected to influence the dependent variables in 
                                                          
16 One might also consider adding a lagged-dependent variable to control for variation that might not be captured by our 
model specification and the control variables. To look into this matter, we ran a Wooldridge panel-autocorrelation test 
(Wooldridge 2010) for our dependent variables. The statistic provided by this test was not significant (p > .20), suggesting 
that the null hypothesis (i.e. that there is no autocorrelation) could not be rejected. Therefore, we do not incorporate a lagged-
dependent variable in our models.    
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our main (second-stage) estimations, on the basis that having released both types of games on more 
occasions in the past is not expected to influence the relative quality of games in each type. Consistent 
with this reasoning, we see that in the first-stage Probit estimation, this variable has a positive and 
significant coefficient (p < .01) on a studio‟s likelihood of releasing at least one game in both 
categories in a given year, and therefore of entering our estimation sample. On the other hand, this 
variable has no significant effect on any of the three of our dependent variables in our second-stage 
(main) estimations (as we confirm by adding it to Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2). We also note that 
the above observations, with respect to significance and non-significance, remain the same if we 
include a set of year indicators in the selection equation. Likewise, the findings from our main 
estimations with the resulting inverse Mill‟s ratio from this slightly different model also exhibit the 
same patterns of significance and non-significance as we discuss below. 
 
Estimation 
 We use panel regression models with robust clustered errors and studio-fixed effects to test 
our hypotheses. The Hausman test indicates that fixed-effects estimation is preferable to random-
effects estimation (chi-sq (31) = 49.95, p < .05). Our estimation sample consists of an unbalanced 
panel, and, as has been noted (e.g., Hayashi 2000: 340-341) linear panel fixed-effects estimations 
extend to unbalanced panels with the same assumptions and implications as for balanced panels. The 
fixed-effects specification allows us to partial out time invariant studio level heterogeneity, yielding 
“within” estimators and a corresponding interpretation. In addition, the robust standard errors, as 
clustered on studios, adjusts for possible non-independence across observations that belong to the 
same studio over time in calculating the coefficients. All of the independent variables and control 
variables are lagged by one year. As noted, our final estimation sample is an unbalanced panel of 462 
observations, with data on 202 studios, covering games released between 1987 and 2009.
17
 
 
 
                                                          
17 There were more than 7,000 unique lead developers working on the games released by these studios in the years in which 
they appear in our estimation sample. Even though they are key human talent for the studios and in the development of video 
games, most lead developers have nowhere close to the fame of CEO‟s, sports players, or movie actors, and therefore 
detailed demographic data for any reasonable level of data coverage were not available. 
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RESULTS 
 Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables in our 
estimations. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) do not suggest that multicollinearity might present a 
problem in interpreting the results from our estimations. The average VIF in our models does not go 
above 6, while there is no individual variable with a VIF above 10. 
 Table 2 presents the results of our estimations. Models 1-3 include all of our control variables 
for the three dependent variables. Models 4-6 introduce Studio age to test H1a, H1b, and H1c. In 
Model 4, Studio age has a positive and significant coefficient (p < .001), providing support for H1a. In 
Model 5, Studio age has a negative and significant coefficient (p < .05) providing support for H1c. 
And in Model 6, Studio age again has a negative and significant coefficient (p < .001), providing 
support for H1c. These results provide consistent support for our baseline predictions about the 
relationship between Studio age and the quality of exploratory and exploitative games. 
 In Models 7-9 we add the interaction term between Studio age and Studio tenure of lead team 
to test H2a, H2b, and H2c. These two variables were centered around their sample means before the 
interaction term was constructed. In Model 7, the interaction term is not significant (and not close to 
significance, p > .70). Therefore, we do not find support for H2a. The effect of Studio age remains 
positive and significant (p < .01). In Model 8, the interaction term has a negative and significant 
coefficient (p < .05), providing support for H2b. The main effect of Studio age remains negative and 
significant (p < .05). In Model 9, the interaction term has a negative and significant coefficient (p < 
.05), supporting H2c. Here, too, the main effect of Studio age remains negative and significant (p < 
.001). In summary, we find support for H2b and H2c, but not for H2a. In addition, the baseline effects 
of Studio age (as in H1a, H1b, and H1c) remain significant in the predicted dimensions once the 
possible moderating effect of Studio tenure of lead team is accounted for. 
 In Models 10-12 we add the interaction term between Studio age and Industry tenure of lead 
team to test H3a, H3b, and H3c. As before, the two variables were centered around their sample 
means before the interaction term was constructed. In Model 10, the interaction term has a positive 
coefficient, as in the predicted direction, but it is not significant (although the case here is not as stark 
as in H2a above, p = .14). Therefore we do not find support for H3a. The main effect of Studio age 
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remains positive and significant (p < .001). In Model 11, the interaction term has a negative 
coefficient, even though it is marginally significant (p < .07), lending some support to H2b. The main 
effect of Studio age remains negative and significant (p < .05). In Model 12, the interaction term has a 
negative and significant coefficient (p < .05), supporting H3c. The main effect of Studio age remains 
negative and significant in this model (p < .001). In summary, we find marginally significant support 
for H3b, significant support for H3c, and no support for H3a. This pattern of significance (and non-
significance) is consistent with our findings for H2a-H2c, and it is a matter we will return to shortly. 
In addition, as before, the baseline effects of Studio age also remain significant in the predicted 
direction in these models.
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Additional analysis 
In our tests of the predicted moderation effects (H2a-H2c and H3a-H3c) we enter each 
interaction term separately to our models. This is because entering the two interactions together leads 
to high multi-collinearity, as indicated by variance inflation figures (VIFs) being well above the figure 
of 10 that is generally suggested (one implication of such high multi-collinearity is that it leads to 
inflated standard errors, making it more difficult to estimate coefficients precisely and thus to detect 
significance). However, we can present additional evidence that is consistent with our reasoning and 
                                                          
18 We also looked into the possibility that our results might be an artifact of ”hot” firms attracting new talent (so talent with 
lower firm-specific and industry-level tenure), where these hot firms also achieve higher quality in their exploratory 
efforts. We first note that it is not necessarily the case that “hot” firms are “young” firms (since we investigate firm age). 
Nevertheless, to look into this matter, we first run models to see whether there might be reverse causality. As we detail 
below, we do not see an indication of this. Second, we test for endogeneity using an instrument for our two human capital 
tenure variables. This test fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity in our estimations with respect to either of our 
tenure measures. First, regarding estimations that might give an indication of reverse causality: For each studio-year 
observation in our estimation sample, we calculate the changes (current year minus the previous year) in the Industry tenure 
of lead team and Studio tenure of lead team. We then use these two new variables (Change in industry tenure of lead team 
and Change in studio tenure of lead team) as dependent variables, which we predict using the performance of a studio (as 
below). We use studio-level fixed effects regressions and year indicators, as in our main models, and capture the 
performance of a studio with, alternatively, (a) media review scores (i.e., the average review ratings, in the same way that we 
calculate the dependent variables in main models) of all games released by the studio, (b) media review scores of exploratory 
(original content) games released by the studio, (c) media review scores of exploitative (non-original content) games 
released by the studio, and (d) media review scores of explorative games as relative to media review scores of exploitative 
games. In none of the eight regression models (two dependent variables crossed by the above four possible measures of 
“Studio performance”) is any of the four “Studio performance” measures a significant predictor of either “Change in 
industry tenure of lead team” or “Change in studio tenure of lead team”. Thus, these models do not provide an indication 
that the quality of the exploratory or exploitative games (or all games in general) developed by a studio drives subsequent 
changes in the tenure composition of its lead team – suggesting that a reverse causality of this kind is unlikely to influence 
our results. Second, we instrument the tenure of employees with the “Average team size” of games produced by the studio 
(we use team size as an instrument for both Industry tenure of lead team and Studio tenure of lead team in separate models). 
In our estimation sample, “Average team size” is correlated positively and significantly (p < .001) with both Industry tenure 
of lead team and Studio tenure of lead team, but it is not significantly correlated with our dependent variable (p > .85). When 
we use this instrument and test for endogeneity with respect to either Industry tenure of lead team or Studio tenure of lead 
team, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity (p > .30). 
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predictions. Specifically, we calculate a new measure “Average proportion of industry tenure of lead 
team that is accumulated in the present studio” – which is the average proportion of a lead team‟s 
industry-wide tenure that has been accumulated in the focal studio. The higher this proportion is, the 
more the studio‟s lead team members have spent their overall industry experience in that studio 
(therefore, having had less occasion to directly learn about and experiment with practices and 
knowledge that might reside in other studios). An extension of our ideas suggests that, like the 
absolute values of Studio tenure of lead team and Industry tenure of lead team, this proportion should 
also moderate the effect of Studio age on the quality of exploitative games, exploratory games, and 
the relative quality of exploratory games. Specifically, we would expect that this proportion (a) would 
enhance the positive effect of Studio age on the quality of exploitative games, (b) would amplify the 
negative effect of Studio age on the quality of exploratory games, and (c) would again amplify the 
negative effect of Studio age on the relative quality of exploratory games, as compared to exploitative 
games. When we add this new proportion variable and its interaction with Studio age (to test the three 
moderating effects specified above) to Models 4, 5, and 6, we see that (a) in Model 4, the interaction, 
as expected, has a positive coefficient but is not significant (p = .16), therefore the first prediction, that 
is akin to H2a and H3a, is not supported, (b) in Model 5, the interaction has a negative and significant 
coefficient (p < .05), lending support to the second prediction, and finally (c) in Model 6, the 
interaction again has a negative and significant coefficient (p < .05). These mirror the results in our 
main regressions, using the absolute levels of studio-specific and industry-level tenure as moderators 
for the age effect. We offer these results as additional evidence for the idea that human capital tenure 
influences the relationship between firm age and the quality of exploitative and exploratory products 
of the firm. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Our research adds complementary insights to a number of research streams by shedding light 
on the innovative roles that are undertaken by new human capital. Our findings contribute to the 
stream of research on inertia, and the problem of what firms should do when they want to improve the 
quality of their exploratory efforts over inertial forces. This culminated from Sorensen and Stuart‟s 
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(2000) finding that firms were relatively better at conducting exploitative work as they age. While 
inertia studies have focused on a range of specific organizational-level mechanisms (e.g. Christensen 
and Bower 1996, Dougherty and Hardy 1996, Hannan and Freeman 1984), and while it has already 
been established that human capital such as that embodying high experience or expertise can 
positively affect firm performance (Kor and Leblebici 2005, Kraatz and Moore 2002, Miller and 
Shamsie 2001), we add the nuance that the tenure of the human capital matters in this interaction with 
firm age and performance. While our study contributes to the knowledge-based view that describes 
how talent can interact with organizational capabilities (e.g. Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, 
Rothaermel and Hess 2007, Tzabbar 2009), we also add to the research stream on how newcomers 
can benefit innovation in teams (Perretti and Negro 2007, Skilton and Dooley 2010, Taylor and Greve 
2006). Our results generalize these findings to the firm level and show that the moderating effects on 
the relationship between firm age and the quality of exploratory products separately holds for both 
“newer human capital to the firm” and “newer human capital to the industry”, but also holds wrinkles 
when we consider the reverse (i.e., effects of longer tenure on the exploitative side). Finally, we note 
that while many studies of exploration and exploitation are focused on the level (or quantity or 
amount) of activity, behavior, or output in terms of whether it is exploratory or exploitative, we 
consider the quality (and not the extent) of these explorative and exploitative outcomes. 
Our approach of treating human capital as being a key constituent of capability is in line with 
suggestions to study the “micro foundations” within theories of strategy (Barney 2011 et al., Barney 
and Felin 2013), and also adds to the literature on resource-bundling mechanisms that are important to 
marshal organizational resources (Sirmon et al. 2007, Sirmon et al. 2008). At their heart both views 
involve integrating core concepts such as capabilities and routines with new human capital in order to 
understand firms‟ ability to better create and capitalize on new opportunities (i.e. explore better). 
Future work may aim to provide a more detailed study of the relationship between human capital and 
more direct measures of organizational capability, such as capabilities and routines. 
Another issue that can be explored further is the implications of interactions between types of 
position. Further study of inter-position or work interactions, such as Mollick‟s (2012) may be 
necessary to advance our understanding of the nuances of how different types of human capital 
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contribute to the firm and interact with firm-level resources. Mollick (2012) found that positions 
involving the routinization of work (producers) provided greater explanatory power over (relatively 
more) exploratory (e.g. designer) positions. For our investigation of the moderating effects of human 
capital tenure on firm age, we did not find such differences between positions. However, future work 
could analyze the blend between types of old and new talent and their performance implications. In 
one of the authors‟ recent interviews, a former CEO and his ex-staff of a console game company (shut 
down in 2012), freely admitted that they themselves did not play apps or smart phone games – and 
hence did not have intimate knowledge of that emerging market segment that was disrupting the entire 
game industry at the time. In contrast, in another studio that the author studied, the CEO started a new 
studio with a core team to enter the smartphone game market, and called on the assistance of partners 
(including a publisher‟s producer) who had familiarity with the new kinds of games. These efforts 
helped the team to effectively reposition itself with a new product for the new (smartphone) market.  
We now turn to the limitations of our study, so that future research using other data and 
research designs can investigate or address their implications. Despite the merits and suitability of our 
setting and the data that we have access to, they still impose limitations that can be overcome with 
access to different data or other research designs. For example, we do not have the exact date at which 
employees join or leave a game development studio. As a result, we are unable to calculate precise 
measures with respect to the employee composition (and therefore, for example, the average tenure) 
of a given studio at a point in time. In a related manner, while there are mergers and acquisitions 
between game development studios, systematic data on these are not available, with the implication 
once again that we have inexact measures of employee composition for a given studio at a given point 
in time (yielding noisier measures of average tenure, for example). In addition while we implement a 
first-stage selection model and look into some implications of possible endogenous “hot-firm” effects 
(as we note in footnote 18), with our data it is not possible to conclusively rule out alternative 
explanations that might relate to selection or endogeneity. Settings that might allow researchers to 
leverage exogenous shocks to enable a quasi-experimental setup, or possibilities to intervene and 
implement field experiments, will go some way towards addressing these concerns. While we have no 
reason to believe that the mechanisms we discuss would be absent in those different circumstances, 
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we acknowledge that this ultimately remains an empirical question. We also acknowledge that our 
measure of quality, as indicated by the scores given by reviewers, embodies just one way of 
considering the matter. Not all settings might provide such extensive data on the assessments by 
reviewers of particular product types. Similarly, there might be settings in which there are multiple 
ways of assessing quality and, furthermore, where these measures are only weakly related. As a 
general matter, the measurement of quality is rather context-specific, and while in the video game 
industry, review scores are widespread, attended to (by both gamers and game developers 
themselves), and relate well to sales of games, one or more of these might not be true in other settings, 
and researchers should make the appropriate adjustments. Finally, more extensive and in-depth 
datasets would allow researchers to also incorporate and leverage the background of human capital 
further, in the ways that these might interact with firm-level mechanisms in influencing the quality of 
different kinds of innovations. 
To conclude with a summary, firms are increasingly interested in welding human capital to 
strategy, as witnessed by the increasing interest of both practice and literature in the issue (Coff and 
Kryscynski 2011, Thomas et al. 2013). Our theory and results suggest that the newness of human 
capital is an important factor for improving aging firms‟ explorative potential. We first confirmed the 
baseline situation that firms do better at exploitative products and worse at explorative products as 
they age. We then showed that human capital with lower firm-specific and lower industry tenure 
moderates these firm-age effects on the quality of explorative products. However, we do not find the 
same effects on the quality of exploitative products. A consideration of the setting yields a possible 
explanation for this lack of support for the exploitation side of the argument. In the video games 
industry, exploitative products, such as sequels and those using franchised content, have to carefully 
manage a balance of the old (e.g. “tried and true”) features with at least some new (i.e., exploratory) 
features (as noted in footnote 15). This was pointed out in a reflection of the making of a sequel to a 
popular franchise: “The game business is brutal to those who fail to move forward with the times, but 
it‟s also equally brutal to those who experiment too much and stray from the expectations of the 
players” (Pritchard 2000). Thus, in settings that are continually changing and evolving, even 
exploitative products may require some level of explorative effort and creativity, as may be spurred 
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by new talent to the firm or to the industry. At the same time, exploitative products in such industries 
can provide a “blueprint” that young but relatively capable firms and their employees are able to 
follow, even without too much experience. As was noted in the earlier cited postmortem of a young 
firm‟s production of a sequel, “a good part of the design work had been done for us [in the original‟s 
design]” (Smith, 2001). As a result of such considerations, in settings such as ours, one might 
consider whether the deeper experience needed to ensure the quality of exploitation would still need 
to be balanced by some inventiveness that may come from having new talent. 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 

 
 
variable mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Quality of exploitative games 84.87 13.10           
2. Quality of exploratory games 82.11 13.07 .27          
3. Quality of exploratory games relative to 
exploitative games 
-2.77 15.74 -.60 .60 
        
4. Studio age 7.47 5.86 .20 .17 -.03        
5. Lead team size 15.60 20.77 .09 .07 -.01 .36       
6. Cumulative number of games released 24.34 29.68 .17 .18 .01 .78 .52      
7. Proportion of original content games released 0.46 0.25 -.11 -.02 .08 .01 -.22 -.03     
8. Industry tenure of lead team 3.88 2.57 .08 .05 -.02 .36 .16 .25 -.24    
9. Standard deviation of industry tenure of lead team 3.21 1.80 .07 .03 -.03 .31 .23 .23 -.32 .77   
10. Studio tenure of lead team 1.60 1.75 .19 .18 -.01 .58 .07 .48 .01 .57 .29  
11.Standard deviation of studio tenure of lead team 1.70 1.46 .18 .16 -.02 .69 .18 .56 .01 .48 .40 .81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          

 n = 462. Correlations greater than |.15| are significant at p < .01. 
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Table 2: Studio-Fixed Effects OLS Regressions Estimating the Quality (i.e., average review score) of Games 

 
 
Dependent variable 
Quality of 
Exploitative 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory Games 
Relative to 
Exploitative Games 
Quality of 
Exploitative 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory Games 
Relative to 
Exploitative Games 
Hypothesis tested baseline baseline baseline H1a H1b H1c 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Studio age       1.515
**
 -1.131
*
 -2.538
***
 
        (0.474) (0.471) (0.662) 
Lead team size -0.001 -0.061 -0.058 -0.001 -0.061 -0.058 
 
(0.027) (0.031) (0.037) (0.027) (0.031) (0.037) 
Cumulative number of games released -0.185
**
 0.122 0.295
***
 -0.185
**
 0.122 0.295
***
 
 
(0.067) (0.073) (0.081) (0.067) (0.073) (0.081) 
Proportion of original content games released 1.753 -13.554
**
 -14.745 1.753 -13.554
**
 -14.745 
 
(5.536) (4.741) (7.540) (5.536) (4.741) (7.540) 
Industry tenure of lead team 0.275 0.645 0.359 0.275 0.645 0.359 
 
(0.722) (0.976) (1.356) (0.722) (0.976) (1.356) 
Std. dev. of industry tenure of lead team 0.254 -0.26 -0.493 0.254 -0.26 -0.493 
 
(0.709) (0.767) (1.039) (0.709) (0.767) (1.039) 
Studio tenure of lead team -0.524 -0.368 0.146 -0.524 -0.368 0.146 
 
(0.869) (1.197) (1.369) (0.869) (1.197) (1.369) 
Std. dev. of studio tenure of lead team -1.541 0.076 1.545 -1.541 0.076 1.545 
 
(0.936) (0.999) (1.198) (0.936) (0.999) (1.198) 
Lambda (, inverse mills) 2.588 -0.422 -2.879 2.588 -0.422 -2.879 
 
(1.542) (1.442) (2.065) (1.542) (1.442) (2.065) 
Quality of exploratory games 0.037 
  
0.037 
  
 
(0.067) 
  
(0.067) 
  Quality of exploitative games
 
0.046 
  
0.046 
 
  
(0.079) 
  
(0.079) 
   
Constant 60.026
***
 99.489
***
 38.593
**
 79.670
***
 84.829
***
 5.692 
 
(9.497) (8.911) (12.502) (8.052) (8.601) (8.093) 
       
R-squared (within) 
 
0.242 0.149 0.192 0.242 0.149 0.192 
       
                                                          
 n = 462. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include unreported year indicators. All tests are two-tailed. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .07 
37 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Quality of 
Exploitative 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory Games 
Relative to 
Exploitative Games 
Quality of 
Exploitative 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory 
Games 
Quality of 
Exploratory Games 
Relative to 
Exploitative Games 
Hypothesis tested H2a H2b H2c H3a H3b H3c 
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Studio age 1.529
**
 -1.154
*
 -2.559
***
 1.515
**
 -1.135
*
 -2.521
***
 
  (0.472) (0.474) (0.660) (0.468) (0.468) (0.648) 
Studio age * Studio tenure of lead team 0.048 -0.085
*
 -0.128
*
       
  (0.045) (0.039) (0.055)       
Studio age * Industry tenure of lead team       0.066 -0.074
+
 -0.133
*
 
        (0.044) (0.041) (0.052) 
Lead team size 0.01 -0.079
*
 -0.085
*
 0.013 -0.077
*
 -0.086
*
 
 
(0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.027) (0.035) (0.038) 
Cumulative number of games released -0.203
**
 0.154
*
 0.341
***
 -0.204
**
 0.144 0.330
***
 
 
(0.070) (0.078) (0.085) (0.067) (0.079) (0.083) 
Proportion of original content games released 1.618 -13.200
**
 -14.202 1.451 -13.116
**
 -13.934 
 
(5.627) (4.741) (7.748) (5.693) (4.713) (7.786) 
Industry tenure of lead team 0.386 0.442 0.058 0.188 0.735 0.525 
 
(0.712) (0.949) (1.319) (0.716) (0.968) (1.322) 
Std. dev. of industry tenure of lead team 0.138 -0.054 -0.183 0.209 -0.21 -0.399 
 
(0.708) (0.790) (1.066) (0.711) (0.778) (1.057) 
Studio tenure of lead team -1.026 0.525 1.478 -0.916 0.08 0.944 
 
(1.203) (1.172) (1.589) (1.039) (1.057) (1.298) 
Std. dev. of studio tenure of lead team -1.437 -0.099 1.269 -1.389 -0.081 1.237 
 
(0.985) (0.958) (1.221) (0.967) (0.972) (1.188) 
Lambda (, inverse mills) 2.688 -0.611 -3.139 2.607 -0.464 -2.913 
 
(1.535) (1.416) (2.016) (1.530) (1.440) (2.042) 
Quality of exploratory games 0.043 
  
0.045 
  
 
(0.068) 
  
(0.068) 
  Quality of exploitative games
 
0.053 
  
0.055 
 
  
(0.079) 
  
(0.080) 
 
       
Constant 78.645
***
 85.312
***
 7.18 77.320
***
 85.991
***
 9.136 
 
(8.105) (8.563) (7.693) (8.162) (8.650) (7.802) 
       
R-squared (within) 0.244 0.157 0.202 0.248 0.156 0.205 
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APPENDIX: First-Stage Probit Regression 

 
 
 
 
Model A1 
Studio age -0.003 
 (0.012) 
Lead team size 0.004 
 
(0.003) 
Cumulative number of games released -0.070
***
 
 
(0.006) 
Proportion of original content games released -0.222
***
 
 
(0.112) 
Industry tenure of lead team -0.074
*
 
 
(0.023) 
Std. dev. of industry tenure of lead team 0.009 
 
(0.029) 
Studio tenure of lead team -0.010 
 
(0.040) 
Std. dev. of studio tenure of lead team 0.009 
 
(0.044) 
 
Number of past years in which the studio 
released both categories of games 
0.753
*** 
(0.043) 
 
 
  
Constant -1.442
***
 
 
(0.100) 
  
Log-likelihood -1060.426 
Wald-chi-squared 436.99 
  
 
 
                                                          
 n = 4660. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the studio released at least one explorative and one exploitative game in a 
given year and is coded 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p 
< .05. 
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